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With Religious Liberty for All:
A Defense of the Affordable
Care Act’s Contraception
Coverage Mandate

T

Frederick Mark Gedicks*

he “contraception mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (the “ACA”) poses a straightforward question for religious liberty jurisprudence: Must government excuse religious persons
from complying with a law they find burdensome, when doing so would violate the
liberty of others by imposing on them the consequences of religious beliefs and practices that they do not share and which interfere with their own religious and other
fundamental liberties? To pose this question is to answer it: One’s religious liberty
does not include the right to interfere with the liberty of others.
The contraception mandate strikes a careful and sensible balance of competing liberty interests by exempting religious persons and organizations who do not externalize
the costs of their religious beliefs and practices onto others who do not share them. It
exempts churches that largely employ and serve persons of their own faith, but not
religious employers who hire and serve large numbers of employees who do not belong
to the employer’s religion or who otherwise reject its anti-contraception values.
That religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional value is not in doubt.1 Access
to contraceptives is also a fundamental constitutional liberty. 2 Constitutionally guaranteed access to contraception, moreover, is a critical component of the well-being
and advancement of women. Control over reproduction has enabled women to time
and space their pregnancies, thereby preserving and enhancing their health and that
of their new-born children,3 and enabling them to enter the workforce on more equal
terms with men.4
* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. Questions and
comments may be directed to the author at gedicksf@law.byu.edu. This Issue Brief was first released by
ACS in October 2012.
1 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States.”); id., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof … .”).
2 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 380 U.S. 947 (1965).
3 See, e.g., Sylvia Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 363,
369-70 (1998); Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and Supplies
without Cost-Sharing, 14 Guttmacher Pol. Rev. 7, 7-8 (Winter 2011).
4 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives.”); Sonfield, supra note 3, at 9 (Access to oral contraception allowed women to
“invest in higher education and a career with far less risk of an unplanned pregnancy,” and resulted in
“fewer first births to high school- and college-aged women, increased age at first marriage, increased participation by women in the workforce and more children born to mothers who were married, college-educated and had pursued a professional career.”).
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Contraception nevertheless remains a significant expense beyond the reach of
many women, because most health insurance plans and policies do not cover them,5
or cover them only with substantial patient cost-sharing.6 The most effective oral contraceptive drugs cost between $180 and $960 per year, depending on the drug prescribed and the area of the country where the prescription is filled, in addition to the
prescribing doctor’s examination fees which can range from $35 to $250 per visit.7
Many women experience side effects from the cheapest oral contraceptives (which are
usually generic brands) or find that these are less effective for them in preventing pregnancy.8 Some of the most inexpensive contraception, such as intrauterine devices
(“IUDs”) and anti-contraceptive drug implants, have high up-front costs ranging from
$500 to $800, in addition, again, to one or more examination fees.9 Such costs are a
significant financial obstacle to the use of contraception by working-class and lowerincome women,10 and simple economics suggests that women of all but the highest
income classes are likely to use contraceptives more often and more consistently when
they can obtain them at no cost.
The ACA seeks to reduce health care costs and improve public health and well-being by encouraging the use of preventive health care services. It thus requires that
group health plans and individual insurance policies cover a range of preventive services without “cost-sharing”—that is, without copayments, coinsurance, deductibles,
or other amounts paid by the patient.11 It is widely agreed that contraception use substantially reduces health care costs.12 Accordingly, administrative rules adopted by the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury (collectively, the
“Departments”) following enactment of the ACA define “preventive health care services” to include FDA-approved contraceptive methods and counseling, including

5 See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 369-70 (“Except for health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
about two-thirds of private insurance plans exclude coverage for contraceptive pills, even though virtually
all private insurance plans include coverage for other prescription drugs.”); C. Keanin Loomis, A Battle
over Birth “Control”: Legal and Legislative Employer Prescription Contraception Benefit Mandates, 11
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 463 (2002) (“[I]t is estimated that forty-nine percent of all health care plans still
do not offer prescription contraceptives.”).
6 See, e.g., Sonfield, supra note 3, at 10 (“A 2010 study found that women with private insurance that
covers prescription drugs paid 53% of the cost of their oral contraceptives,” and that this expense amounted to “29% of their annual out-of-pocket expenditures for all health services.”).
7 E.g., P lanned Parenthood, B irth C ontrol M ethods —B irth C ontrol Options ,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birth-control-4211.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012)
[hereinafter “Birth Control Costs”]; Ctr. for Am. Progress, The High Costs of Birth Control: It’s
Not As Affordable As You Think (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/
news/2012/02/15/11054/the-high-costs-of-birth-control/.
8 Cf. Sonfield, supra note 3, at 9 (“[O]ne-third of women using reversible contraception would switch
methods if they did not have to worry about cost; these women were twice as likely as others to rely on
lower-cost, less effective methods.”).
9 “Birth Control Costs,” supra note 7; James Trussell et al., Cost Effectiveness of Contraceptives in
the United States, 79 Contraceptives 5, 5-6, 9-10, 13 (2009).
10 See Law, supra note 3, at 392-93.
11 Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 2713, 124 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)) (2010).
12 See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 366-67 & n.13, 394-95; Loomis, supra note 5, at 477-78; Sonfield,
supra note 3, at 10; Trussell, supra note 9, at 5.
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“emergency contraception” which can prevent pregnancy after intercourse or fertilization, such as Plan B (the “morning-after pill”), Ella (the “week-after pill”), and IUDs.13
Some religious organizations and persons objected to the mandate on theological
grounds. Roman Catholic teaching, for example, condemns the use of all “artificial”
methods of contraception. Catholic universities, hospitals, charities, and other nonprofit organizations thus objected to the requirement that their group health plans
comply with the mandate, even though they employ and serve large numbers of nonCatholics. Nonprofits affiliated with Protestant denominations and other religions
that do not generally condemn contraceptive use objected to the mandated coverage
of emergency contraception, which their affiliated religions teach is morally equivalent to aborting a pregnancy—again, even though they employ and service large numbers who do not object to emergency contraception. Finally, a few private for-profit
employers engaged in commercial businesses have objected to the mandate on the
grounds that it violates the personal religious beliefs of their owners.
The Departments accommodated the objections of religious employers by exempting from the mandate tax-exempt organizations whose mission is the teaching of religious values primarily to members of their own faith through employees of their own
faith.14 In effect, this definition exempted churches and their integrated auxiliaries.
Some religious nonprofit and commercial employers continued to object to the mandate because their provision of secular or commercial products and services to persons outside their affiliated faith, and their employment of large numbers of people
who do not belong to the faith, left them outside the proposed religious-employer
exemption.15 When the government declined to enlarge the exemption, a number of
these religious employers filed suit, arguing that the contraception mandate violated
their rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).16
The rhetoric of religious employers challenging the mandate loosely frames the
issue as an unwarranted federal violation of the religious liberty of nonexempt religious employers, and generally fails even to mention the federal government’s weighty

13 Section 2713 of the Public Health Act, enacted as part of the ACA, included within the definition
of preventive health care services “such additional preventive care and screenings” not otherwise covered,
“as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services
Administration” (the “HRSA”). 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (West 2012). The HRSA subsequently adopted
women’s coverage guidelines which include “contraceptive methods and counseling,” defined as “[a]ll Food
and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education
and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services: Required
Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
14 The implementing rules define a “religious employer”, as any employer that
(1) “Has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose”;
(2) “[P]rimarily employs persons who share its religious tenets”;
(3) “[P]rimarily serves persons who share its religious tenets”; and
(4) “[I]s a non-profit organization” under enumerated sections of the Internal Revenue Code which
generally refer to “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any religious order.”
76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (citing and describing I.R.C. §§ 6033(a)(1), - (a)(3)(A)(i) & (a)(3)(A)(iii)).
15 For a summary of comments for and against the religious-employer exemption, see Group Health
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726-27 (Feb. 15, 2012).
16 A link to the various lawsuits, which as of the date of this Paper numbered over thirty, is a maintained by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty at http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/.
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interests in protecting the religious liberty and enlarging the access to contraceptives
of employees who do not share the religious values of their employers.
This Issue Brief demonstrates that the contraception mandate does not violate the
Religion Clause or RFRA rights of religious employers.17 The mandate is a “religiously neutral, generally applicable” law that does not discriminate against religious employers, does not entangle courts or government generally in disputes about theology
or internal church governance, and does not “substantially burden” religious exercise.
The mandate is additionally justified as the least restrictive means of protecting compelling government interests. Finally, while all these conclusions apply fully to religious nonprofit organizations, they apply with special force to religious owners of
secular businesses engaged in for-profit commercial markets.

I.

Religion Clauses
A. Free Exercise Clause

It is well-established that burdens on individual religious exercise imposed by “religiously neutral, generally applicable” laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.18
A free exercise exemption from the societal obligation to obey the law is generally
compelled only when the law violates neutrality and generality by discriminating
against or targeting religious conduct while leaving comparable secular conduct
alone.19 As a religiously neutral, generally applicable law, the contraception mandate
cannot plausibly be challenged under the Free Exercise Clause.
1. Religious Neutrality

A law lacks religious neutrality if it restricts religious practices because they are
religious—that is, if it discriminates on the basis of religion.20 Such discrimination
occurs when a law defines the class it regulates in religious terms or applies only to
certain religious people or to religion generally. 21 A set of health and animal protection laws, for example, whose effect was to prohibit the animal-sacrifice rituals of a
17 One federal district court recently rejected Religion Clause and RFRA challenges to the mandate,
concluding that religious employers have no right to impose their religious beliefs on employees who reject
them, O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), slip op.
at 9-22, and two influential state supreme courts have rejected Religion Clause challenges to state contraception mandates identical to that of the ACA on the same ground. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004) and Catholic Charities of Diocese of
Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007). On the other hand, one
federal district court has temporarily restrained enforcement of the mandate on RFRA grounds against a
single for-profit employer. Newland v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK (D. Colo. July 27, 2012).
18 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990). The Court has repeatedly affirmed this
doctrine in the decades since Smith was decided. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971,
2993 n.24 (2010); Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006);
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997); Church of
the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); cf. Hosanna-Tabor Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012) (distinguishing Smith in recognizing ministerial exception to
federal anti-discrimination laws).
19 E.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating municipal ordinances whose net combined effect
permitted virtually all secular and religious killings of animals except those by minority religious sect).
20 Id. at 533.
21 Id. (“[T]he minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law
lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the
language or context.”); id. at 534, 535 (“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. [] Apart from the
text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”).
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minority sect while exempting hunting, fishing, and kosher slaughter from that prohibition, constituted a “religious gerrymander” that is not religiously neutral.22
Some of the anti-mandate plaintiffs argue that the mandate’s religious exemption
is not religiously neutral because it burdens the teachings, practices, or beliefs of religious employers that oppose contraception on religious grounds but do not fall within
the exemption. The mandate obviously has a greater impact on Catholic and other
religious institutions that oppose some or all of the mandated contraception coverage
than it has on secular organizations and religious institutions that do not oppose any
of the mandated coverage. This religiously disproportionate impact of the mandate,
however, does not constitute religious discrimination or gerrymandering. Free exercise doctrine condemns only intentional religious discrimination, not religious burdens occurring as the incidental effect of a neutral and general law. 23
The Departments determined that employees of exempt religious employers were
likely to adhere to their church’s anti-contraceptive orthodoxy regardless of the cost of
the contraceptives, so that exempting such employers from the mandate would enhance religious liberty without significantly intruding upon the religious liberty of employees or undermining the mandate’s regulatory goal of affording women access to
no-cost contraception.24 Nonexempt religious employers that oppose contraception,
but are participating in a secular or commercial market that delivers goods or services
to those outside as well as within the faith largely through employment of persons who
are not members of the faith, will almost always have a large number of employees
who do not share their employer’s opposition to contraception and would likely use
contraceptives (or use them more consistently) if they were available without costsharing.25 With respect to such employers, the Departments determined to minimize
“religious externalities”—that is, a religious organization’s use of the economic leverage that inheres in an employment relationship to impose its religious anti-contraception beliefs on unbelievers, members of other faiths, and members of the employer’s
faith who do not share its understanding of the faith’s requirements. As the Departments
observed, exempting religious organizations that participate in secular markets and
employ large numbers of nonmember employees “would subject their employees to the
religious views of the employer, limiting access to contraceptives, and thereby inhibiting the use of contraceptive services and the benefits of preventive care.”26
There is little doubt that the contraception mandate is religiously neutral. Neither
the text of the ACA nor that of the implementing regulations facially discriminates on
the basis of religion. Both apply the mandate to covered group health plans and health
insurance carriers that are defined in purely secular terms. Nor are the ACA or its
implementing regulations religiously gerrymandered or susceptible to discriminatory
application that would to impose them on only some religious organizations, but not
others.27 The only religious language in the regulations relates to the definition of
22

See id. at 535.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (The Free Exercise Clause is not violated where a burden on religious
practice “is not the object … but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise
valid” law.”).
24 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 A religiously discriminatory pattern of enforcing the mandate and the exemption differently against
religious employers could violate religious neutrality, cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating race-neutral ordinance applied in racially discriminatory manner), but any challenge on this ground
will obviously have to await actual application and enforcement of the mandate and the exemption.
23
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“religious employers” who are exempt from the mandate. Finally, as a matter of constitutional policy, it would make little sense to invalidate a religious exemption as “too
narrow” when the free exercise doctrine relieves the government of the obligation to
provide any exemption at all. Invalidating religious exemptions that relieve some but
not all conceivable free exercise burdens would create the perverse governmental incentive not to allow any exemptions in the first place.28
2. General Applicability

The requirement of “general applicability” is an additional protection against religious discrimination or “targeting”—that is, a protection against laws that pursue
legitimate secular objectives only against religious conduct.29 A law satisfies this requirement if it does not focus its burdens solely or mostly on religious organizations
or religious individuals.30 A large number of exemptions for secular but not religious
conduct often signals a law’s lack of general applicability.
The vast majority of employers subject to the contraception mandate are secular.
The mandate contains no secular exemptions, only the “religious employer” exemption. The mandate is thus generally applicable because it pursues its goal of providing
widespread no-cost contraceptive coverage through all employers, not just religious
ones. The ACA does exempt certain “grandfathered” group insurance plans from the
no-cost preventive-care mandate of which the contraception mandate is a part, and
also exempts certain religious persons from the entire ACA. Some of the anti-mandate
plaintiffs have erroneously argued that when combined with these broader exemptions,
the contraception mandate exempts so many persons or institutions that its refusal to
exempt all religious employers violates the principle of general applicability. However,
these exemptions do nothing to undermine the general applicability of the mandate.
a. The Individual Insurance-Purchase Mandate Exemptions 

The ACA exempts certain classes of persons from the mandate to purchase health
insurance, such as those who belong to religions that reject the use of health insurance, undocumented aliens, those incarcerated in federal or state prison, those who
cannot afford coverage, members of federally recognized Indian tribes, and those
granted a hardship exception by HHS.31 These exemptions to the “individual insurance-purchase mandate” are irrelevant to analyzing the general applicability of the
contraception mandate. Exemptions from the individual-purchase mandate excuse
28 Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006) (“To hold that any
religious exemption that is not all-inclusive renders a statute non-neutral would be to discourage the enactment of any such exemptions—and thus to restrict, rather than to promote, freedom of religion.”),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007).
29 See Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (“[L]aws
burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. [I]nequality results when a legislature decides
that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with
a religious motivation.”).
30 Since a law that pursues legitimate government objectives only against religious organizations or
individuals is not religiously neutral, it is not clear that general applicability has any independent doctrinal significance. The Court itself sees neutrality and generality as merely mutually reinforcing tests: A law
that religiously discriminates is usually not generally applicable, and vice versa. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531;
see also id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the terms
“substantially overlap”: Religious neutrality invalidates laws that facially discriminate on the basis of religion, whereas general applicability invalidates facially neutral laws that discriminate on the basis of religion “through their design, construction, or enforcement.”)
31 42 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)-(e) (West 2012).
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one from the obligation to purchase health insurance coverage, whereas exemption
from the contraception mandate excuses one from the obligation to provide no-cost
contraception coverage in an insurance plan; the one has nothing to do with the other.
An exemption from the insurance-purchase mandate would not exempt a person from
the contraception mandate (if he or she happened also to be an employer or insurer),
and employers or insurers exempted from the contraception mandate would not automatically be exempted from the individual-purchase mandate (if they happened to
be individuals). Indeed, the failure of the ACA to provide any exemptions at all from
the individual-purchase mandate would not have impacted the contraception or preventive-care mandates, and vice versa.32 The goals of the individual-purchase mandate differ substantially from the goals of the contraception and preventive-coverage
mandates. Accordingly, religious employers that are not exempt from the contraception mandate cannot use the exemptions from the individual-purchase mandate to
argue that the contraception mandate violates general applicability.
b. The “Grandfathered Plan” Exemption

The ACA allows individuals who are satisfied with their existing health care coverage to keep it. Accordingly, the ACA exempts from many of its provisions, including
the contraception mandate, group health insurance plans existing on the date on
which the ACA was enacted, as long as such plans do not significantly change the
coverage they offered as of that date.33 This exemption is also generally applicable.
Religiously sponsored group-insurance plans in existence when the ACA was enacted
are as eligible as secularly sponsored plans to maintain their then-existing coverage
and preserve their grandfathered-plan exemption from the ACA, including the contraception mandate. Nothing in the text of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions imposes any greater burdens or requirements on religiously sponsored plans for
obtaining and maintaining grandfathered status. Thus, like the individual-mandate
exemptions, the grandfathered-plan exemption is also irrelevant to the analysis of the
contraception mandate’s general applicability analysis.
*

*

*

Neither the “religious-employer” exemption to the contraception mandate, the individual exemptions to the individual-purchase mandate, nor the grandfathered-plan
exemption to the ACA offers any benefits or advantages to secular employers that are
not also available to religious employers. Taken together, the exemptions do not result
in the contraception mandate’s being imposed solely or primarily on religious employers. To the contrary, employers subject to the mandate remain overwhelmingly
secular notwithstanding these exemptions. Accordingly, none of these exemptions
cause the contraception mandate to violate the principle of general applicability.

32 Cf. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (Exemption of
undercover officers from police force’s no-beard policy did not violate principle of general applicability,
because exemption of persons not identifiable as police officers had no effect on the policy’s goals of uniformity, morale, and esprit de corps.).
33 Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1251, 124 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011) (2010). The Departments
view the grandfathered-plan exemption as transitional. Over time, they expect that the sponsors of most
grandfathered plans will decide either to abandon grandfathered status and become fully subject to the
ACA, or to cease offering group health insurance altogether. 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34547, 34548.
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B. Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause prohibits “theological entanglement”—the government’s deciding questions of religious doctrine, intervening on one side or the other
of a dispute about such questions, or interfering in the internal governance of religious congregations. 34 Some of the mandate-litigation plaintiffs have argued that
deciding whether a religious organization has the “inculcation of religious values” as
its purpose and applying the other elements of the “religious-employer” exemption
violate this anti-entanglement norm. The mandate, however, does not cause theological entanglement.
Courts may not decide religious questions, but they possess full power to decide
whether and how the law applies to religious organizations and individuals. Legislative
accommodations of religion would be impossible if government were “forbidden to
distinguish between the religious entities and activities that are entitled to accommodation and the secular entities and activities that are not.”35 Thus, the “ministerial
exception” from federal antidiscrimination laws prohibits courts from deciding whom
a congregation must accept as its minister, but courts are nevertheless empowered to
decide who is a “minister” for the purpose of determining whether the exception applies to a congregational employment decision.36 Similarly, courts may not decide
whether an organization’s decision to call itself a “religion” is theologically justified,
but it may decide whether the organization is “religious” for the purpose of applying
Internal Revenue Code laws that define charitable income tax deductions.37
The Establishment Clause prohibits a court from telling any religious employer
what its values are with respect to contraception use and whether or how it must
exercise them, but the Clause does not prohibit a court from deciding whether a religious organization qualifies for the “religious-employer” exemption as an organization that exists to inculcate religious values. 38 The exemption, therefore, does not
entangle federal courts or the federal government generally in religious doctrine or
religious disputes.
*

*

*

Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause provides any plausible basis on which to challenge the contraception mandate. The contraception
mandate lies fully within the constitutional limits that these Clauses place on government action.

II.

Religious Freedom Restoration Act

34 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangel. Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012); Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190
(1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
35 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 79 (Cal.), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
816 (2004).
36 Compare Hosanna-Tabor Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (holding that
Religion Clauses encompass a “ministerial exception” that prohibits the application of the Americans
with Disabilities Act to a church’s decision to terminate a minister), with id. at 707-09 (analyzing whether plaintiff was a “minister” for purposes of the exception).
37 See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989).
38 Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 n.30 (1982) (explaining that the Establishment Clause does
not preclude government from requiring that organization claiming religious exemption prove that it is
religious).
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RFRA provides that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a law of general applicability,” unless
the government demonstrates that the burden furthers “a compelling government interest” using “the least restrictive means.”39 This section discusses “substantial burden” under RFRA, while Part III following immediately after, discusses the
compelling-interest test, which applies to both free exercise and RFRA claims.
Nonexempt religious employers claim that the contraception mandate violates
RFRA because their beliefs and teachings prohibit the use of some or all of the contraceptive coverage that the mandate requires. What follows concludes that (A) the
simple addition of mandated contraception coverage to a plan sponsored by a nonexempt religious employer, without any other changes, does not constitute a “substantial burden” on the religious exercise of such employers under RFRA; and (B) even
assuming that it did, various alternative means of satisfying the mandate do not constitute burdens on religious practice at all, let alone “substantial” ones.
A. Addition of Contraceptive Coverage

The government imposes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise when it compels a person or group “to engage in conduct proscribed by their religious beliefs,” or
forces them “to abstain from any action which their religion mandates they take.”40
Literal compulsion is not necessary for a burden to be “substantial;” “substantial
pressure” on a person or group to modify their behavior in a way that violates their
beliefs constitutes a substantial burden.41
The purported burden on nonexempt religious employers consists of requiring
them to make contraceptives available through their health care plans, which, it is argued, violates their religious liberty to oppose a practice which they believe to be sinful or immoral. The simple act of adding mandated coverage to an employer’s existing
health plan, however, does not substantially burden an employer’s ability to oppose
contraception, because it neither requires the employer to use contraceptives, nor to
endorse, encourage, or pay any meaningful amount for such use.
1. Use

Nothing in the mandate requires or pressures any employer to use contraceptives.
After complying with the mandate, a religious employer remains as free as before to
refrain from using contraceptives.42 The mandate, therefore, does not burden at all a
religious employer’s practice of the anti-contraception tenets of his or her religion.

39 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (West 2012). RFRA has been declared unconstitutional as applied to the
states, but continues to be fully applicable against federal government action like the contraception mandate. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
40 Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Goodall v. Stafford Cty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d
168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995). There is some question whether a secular for-profit business is a “person” who
might “exercise” religion within the meaning of RFRA. Newland v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK
(D. Colo. July 27, 2012).
41 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
42 O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), slip op.
at 11 (“[P]laintiffs remain free to exercise their religion, by not using contraceptives … .”); cf. Goehring v.
Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (Mandatory state university student fee that subsidized health
insurance covering abortion did not burden religious exercise of anti-abortion students under RFRA because they “are not required to accept, participate in, or advocate in any manner for the provision of
abortion services.”), overruled on other grounds, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (RFRA
unconstitutional as applied to state action).
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2. Endorsement

The mandate does not require any employer to endorse the use of the mandated
contraception coverage.43 Nonexempt religious employers who oppose contraception
are free to preach against the use of some or all of the covered services and otherwise
to urge employees not to make use of them.44 Nor is there any implicit endorsement.
Under the mandate, employers do not make any decision about the use of mandated
contraceptives by their employees; all such decisions are made by each individual employee, who may not even be a member of the employer’s faith. It is hard to see, therefore, how employee decisions to use contraceptives constitute a “substantial burden”
on the employer’s religious liberty right to avoid endorsing contraception use. This is
particularly true because medical privacy laws make it impossible to know whether
any employees are using contraceptives, and the employer remains free to speak out
against contraceptives and to disassociate itself from their use.45
3. Facilitation

Nonexempt religious employers also object that the mandate requires them to “facilitate” conduct to which they religiously object. This is true in the sense that the
mandate makes contraceptive use cheaper and more accessible; that is, after all, its
goal. The relevant question, however, is not whether the mandate makes contraception use by employees of religious employers more likely, but whether any such effect
constitutes a substantial burden on the employer’s religious exercise.
It is axiomatic that religious employers have no religious liberty right to limit the
spending of employee compensation to conform to the employer’s religious sensibilities. Health care insurance coverage is simply employee compensation. Instead of
compensating employees entirely in wages or salary, the employer pays a reduced
wage or salary plus a health insurance benefit. As with other employee compensation,
decisions about whether or how to spend one’s health care benefit rest entirely with
the employee. Compensating an employee with health care insurance that allows her
to choose to use contraceptives does not facilitate contraception any more than paying wages or salary that the employee uses to purchase contraceptives outright.46
4. Subsidy

Whether the mandate in fact forces nonexempt religious employers to subsidize
contraceptive use to which they religiously object may not be answerable in the
43

Cf. Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1300.
O’Brien, slip op. at 11 (“[P]laintiffs remain free to exercise their religion … by discouraging employees from using contraceptives.”).
45 A useful analogy to this question exists in Establishment Clause doctrine. See Caroline Mala
Corbin, Contraception Mandate (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript, copy in possession of author,
cited with permission). In analyzing use of government funds and in-kind aid by religious organizations,
the Court has repeatedly held that government aid that finds its way to religious organizations or individuals as the result of the genuinely independent choices of individuals is not attributable to the government
and thus does not violate the Clause. E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993); Witters v. Dep’t
of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). For example, private school
voucher programs generally do not violate the Establishment Clause even if the primary beneficiaries are
religious schools, because the decision to use the voucher at a religious school is made by individual parents on behalf of their children, and not by the government. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-51. Similarly, a religious employer’s inclusion of contraceptives in health plan coverage cannot reasonably be viewed as an
endorsement of their use, when the decision to use them rests solely with individual employees and not
with the employer.
46 See O’Brien, slip op. at 12-13.
44
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abstract.47 Even if such a subsidy were found to exist, however, it would not constitute
a substantial burden under RFRA. The courts have long held that compelled payment
of a neutral and general tax does not burden the taxpayer’s religious free exercise even
if a portion of the tax funds activities to which the taxpayer objects,48 concluding that
in such cases the burden on the taxpayer’s religious exercise is insignificant because the
amount of the taxpayer’s funds is minimal and is allocated to the objectionable activities indirectly as the result of the decisions of third parties.”49 The analysis for compelled employer payment for health plan coverage of mandated contraceptives is
virtually the same. The amount allocable to contraception coverage will be a tiny
percentage of a plan’s reimbursable costs,50 and will be incurred indirectly as the result

47 There is a broad consensus that the addition of contraception coverage would reduce the net reimbursable costs of any health insurance plan. Coverage of contraception does not appreciably increase the
reimbursable costs of a health insurance plan, but substantially reduces substantial reimbursable costs
from prenatal care, childbirth, and medical treatment of newborns. See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 366-67
& n.13, 394-95; Loomis, supra note 5, at 477-78; Sonfield, supra note 3, at 10. See generally Trussell, supra
note 9, at 5 (“Contraceptive use saves nearly US$19 billion in direct medical costs each year.”). Accordingly,
the premiums charged to employers by third-party insurers are not likely to increase and could be even
lower when plans add no-cost contraception coverage. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 8727-28. For any particular plan,
then, its savings in net reimbursable costs avoided by addition of contraception coverage are likely to equal
or exceed the costs of mandated contraception coverage. If a nonexempt religious employer sees its health
insurance premiums remain the same or decline after adoption of mandated contraception coverage, then
the marginal cost to the employer of adopting such coverage is zero or less. In an economic sense, the employer has not “paid” for the addition of the mandated coverage because it has not cost the employer any
additional premium. In another sense, however, nonexempt religious employers who include mandated
no-cost contraceptive coverage to their health plans are obviously paying for it: They pay a negotiated
premium to a third party insurer for employee health care coverage that includes no-cost contraceptive
services; some portion of the premium paid would logically seem to be allocable to the provision of contraception services. The subsidy is even more obvious in case of employers who self-insure their health care
plans: Such employers will directly reimburse health care providers for the cost of the contraception services they would provide under the mandate. Whether a religious-employer subsidy of contraceptive use in
fact exists with respect to the any such employer’s health care insurance plan can only be answered by
discovery and analysis of the plan in litigation.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (mandatory payment of social security and unemployment insurance taxes did not burden employer whose Amish tenets prohibited payment for or acceptance of government benefits); Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that use of portion of mandatory student registration fee to subsidize student health insurance program that covered
abortion did not substantially burden religious exercise of students whose beliefs forbid participation in
abortions), overruled on other grounds, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state action); cf. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding
that ACA’s individual insurance-purchase mandate did not substantially burden religious exercise of persons whose believed “God will provide for their medical and financial needs” when they had historically
paid medicare, social security, and unemployment insurance taxes), aff ’d on other grounds, NFIB v.
Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
49 Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1300 (burden is “minimal”); Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (burden is “de
minimis”).
50 Loomis, supra note 5, at 465 & n.8 (“[When the expenses of contraception are pooled, the increase
in cost to employers and employees is negligible … . [] ‘The added cost for employers providing [contraception] coverage corresponds to $1.43 per month, which represents a mean increase of less than 1% in employers’ costs of providing employees with medical coverage.’”) (quoting Jacqueline E. Darroch, Cost
to Employer Health Plans of Covering contraceptives (1998)).
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of the private and independent choices of employees.51 If this is a burden on the employer’s religious exercise at all, it certainly is not “substantial.”
5. Existing Off-Label Coverage

Oral and other hormonal contraceptives are often prescribed for reasons other
than preventing pregnancy. 52 Many nonexempt religious employers who oppose the
contraception mandate have actually covered the mandated contraceptive services for
many years, so long as they are prescribed for a reason other than preventing pregnancy. Roman Catholic “double-effect doctrine,” for example, permits the use of contraceptives to treat a variety of conditions unrelated to preventing pregnancy,53 and
even some self-insured plans by nonexempt Roman Catholic employers reimburse
health care providers for filling contraceptive prescriptions written to treat such conditions. The burden that the contraception mandate imposes on the anti-contraception beliefs of nonexempt religious employers is reduced when such employers already
cover the mandated contraceptives for treatment of conditions unrelated to preventing pregnancy. In such circumstances, the mandate does not require the addition of
contraceptive coverage in the first place, but only addition of a basis for provider reimbursement when contraception is prescribed.
*

*

*

The contraception mandate does not require any religious employer to use, endorse, facilitate, or directly pay any meaningful amount for the use of contraceptives.
When combined with the fact that many nonexempt religious employers already cover
many mandated contraceptives when prescribed for reasons other than preventing
pregnancy, any burden the mandate imposes on a religious employer’s exercise of its
religious anti-contraception tenets approaches the vanishing point.
B. Non-Burdensome Alternatives

As a general matter, religious organizations and individuals may not dictate to the
government the conditions on which they will comply with the law. The broad
51

O’Brien, slip op. at 11, 13.
The burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will contribute to a group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by health
care providers and patients covered by [plaintiff]’s plan, subsidize someone else’s
participation in an activity that is condemned by plaintiff’s religion. This Court
rejects the proposition that requiring indirect financial support of a practice, from
which plaintiff himself abstains according to his religious principles, constitutes a
substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise.
… Under plaintiff’s interpretation of RFRA, a law substantially burdens one’s religion whenever it requires an outlay of funds that might eventually be used by a third
party in a manner inconsistent with one’s religious values. This is at most a de minimis burden on religious practice.

Id.
See Rachel K. Jones, Beyond Birth Control: The Overlooked Benefits of Oral Contraceptive Pills
(Guttmacher Inst., Nov. 2011), at 3.
53 Cf. Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, pt. 2, ex. 3, Stan. Encyc. Phil. (July 28, 2004, rev.
Sept. 7, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ (“A doctor who believed that abortion was
wrong, even in order to save the mother’s life, might nevertheless consistently believe that it would be
permissible to perform a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman with cancer. In carrying out the hysterectomy, the doctor would aim to save the woman’s life while merely foreseeing the death of the fetus.”).
52
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religious pluralism of American society makes it impractical, if not impossible, to
exempt or accommodate every variant of religious practice that might be burdened by
neutral and general laws.54 Accordingly, it is well established that religiously neutral,
generally applicable laws that merely make religious exercise more difficult or expensive without prohibiting it do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.55 Thus, when government imposes a religiously neutral, generally applicable obligation that can be
satisfied in multiple ways, some of which do not substantially burden religious exercise, the obligation does not constitute a “substantial burden” even if the nonburdensome alternatives are more difficult, more expensive, or less preferred by the religious
organization or individual. In other words, a religious employer may not claim a “substantial burden” under RFRA simply because government action interferes with the
employer’s preferred manner of operating, so long as other more difficult or expensive
ways of complying with the action do not interfere with the employer’s religious exercise.56 Applying this analysis, three alternatives to adding mandated contraception
coverage do not burden employer religious exercise: the grandfathered-plan exemption, provision of the mandated contraceptives by third-party insurers, and termination of health care coverage.
1. Grandfathered-Plan Exemption

As explained above, subject to certain conditions, the ACA allows health care
plans to continue the coverage in existence at the time the ACA was enacted. If a nonexempt religious employer offered a plan without contraceptive coverage as of the day
the ACA was enacted, it may continue that plan without adding the mandated contraception coverage. The contraception mandate, therefore, does not constitute a substantial burden on any nonexempt religious employer whose plan qualifies for the
grandfathered-plan exemption.
2. Third-Party Insurers

The final interim regulations affirming the religious-employer exemption also announced a one-year enforcement safe harbor for religious organizations that do not
qualify as “religious employers” under the exemption, during which the Departments
indicated their intention to “work with stakeholders to develop alternative ways of
providing contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing” for employees of nonexempt
religious employers that object to the mandate.57 Specifically, the Departments intend
to develop regulations allowing a religious organization to contract with third-party
insurers to offer health insurance that does not cover contraception to which they
object, so long as the third-party insurer provides the uncovered contraception directly

54

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1980); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 704, 706 (1986)
(plurality opinion); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
56 See, e.g., Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that individual insurancepurchase mandate was not substantial burden under RFRA where plaintiffs could make a “shared responsibility payment” instead of actually obtaining health insurance); cf. Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village
of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that village’s refusal to allow construction of
church in industrial zone was not a substantial burden under RLUIPA where many alternative locations
within village were available).
57 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012). The Departments also announced their intention to pursue
alternatives for self-insured religious organizations that object to the mandate, but did not identify any
potential alternatives. Id.
55
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to the organization’s employees at no cost.58 This alternative should eliminate any
conceivable substantial burden for nonexempt religious employers who provide health
care coverage through a third-party insurer. The employer is not explicitly or implicitly endorsing or facilitating contraception use, since it is not providing contraceptives. The employer also is not subsidizing contraception use: since contraception
coverage does not raise the net health care costs, the premium should be the same
whether contraception is covered or not.59
Third-party provision of the mandated contraception will not relieve any burdens
imposed by the mandate on nonexempt religious employers who self-insure. Selfinsurance means that there is no third-party insurer available to such employers with
the financial ability and incentive to supply the mandated contraception services without cost-sharing; self-insured employers would have to supply the contraceptives
themselves. Self-insurers, however, are free to implement their health insurance plans
through third-party insurers who supply mandated contraceptives without cost-sharing. There is no constitutional right to self-insure; indeed, in most states self-insurance is a privilege governed by statute. Switching to a third-party insurer will probably
cost the religious employer more and may be undesirable in other ways, but Supreme
Court precedent is clear that such burdens are not substantial.
3. Termination of Plan

Some comments by nonexempt religious employers on the proposed interim final
regulations threatened termination of their health care plans if the religious-employer exemption were not expanded.60 For religious employers with less than 50 employees, termination of health insurance coverage constitutes a means of complying with
the mandate without burdening such employers’ religious anti-contraception beliefs.61 Employers who feel a religious obligation to provide their employees with
health care insurance could supply them with additional salary compensation sufficient to purchase adequate health care insurance on the individual-policy market that
the ACA is creating.62
It would be ironic if the effect of a statutory initiative designed to extend health
care insurance coverage to the uninsured population resulted in termination of group
insurance plans by some nonexempt religious employers. Whether this possibility is
an acceptable trade-off for extended contraception coverage, however, is a legislative
58

Id.
For a discussion of why the premium should be the same whether contraception is covered or not,
see sources cited supra note 48 and accompanying text. A nonexempt religious employer can ensure that
it is not paying for its insurers’ separate provision of no-cost contraceptives by instructing the insurer to
calculate the employer’s premium as if its employees do not have access to contraceptives.
60 77 Fed. Reg. at 8727.
61 Employers with less than 50 employees are not required by the ACA to offer health insurance coverage. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H)(c)(2)(A) (West 2012). Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91-92 (Cal.) (“Catholic Charities may … avoid this conflict by not offering coverage for
prescription drugs. The [state contraception mandate] applies only to employers who choose to offer insurance coverage for prescription drugs; it does not require any employer to offer such coverage.”), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y.
2006) (The state contraception mandate “does not literally compel” religious employers “to purchase
contraceptive coverage for their employees, in violation of their religious beliefs; it only requires that policies that provide prescription drug coverage include coverage for contraceptives. Plaintiffs are not required
by law to purchase prescription drug coverage at all.”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007).
62 Cf. Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 468 (“[I]t is surely not impossible, though it may be expensive or difficult,
to compensate employees adequately without including prescription drugs in their group health care
policies.”).
59
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policy choice that does not affect the conclusion that termination of one’s health care
plan would remove an employer from the contraception mandate, and thus constitutes a non-burdensome way to comply with the mandate.

III. The Compelling Interest Test
A law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it lacks neutrality or generality, so long as it is narrowly tailored to the protection of compelling government
interests.63 Similarly, a law does not violate RFRA even if it substantially burdens religious exercise, if it satisfies the compelling interest test.64 The contraception mandate
satisfies both requirements.
A. Government Interests

The Departments identified multiple government interests implemented by the
contraception mandate, including better treatment of conditions unrelated to pregnancy for which contraceptives are often prescribed,65 improvement of the health of
pregnant women and newborn children,66 reduction in the cost of employer-sponsored health care plans,67 reduction in workplace inequalities between men and
women,68 and reduction in the disparate health care costs borne by men and women.69
Some of these interests have been held to be individually “compelling,”70 or have been
found individually to outweigh personal free exercise or other constitutional rights
even though not formally labeled “compelling.”71 Any of these interests would individually satisfy the requirement of a compelling government interest. Courts have also

63

E.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (West 2012).
65 77 Fed. Reg. at 8727 (“Contraceptives also have medical benefits for women who are contra
indicated for pregnancy, and there are demonstrated preventive health benefits from contraceptives relating to conditions other than pregnancy (e.g., treatment of menstrual disorders, acne, and pelvic pain).”).
66 Id. (“[W]omen experiencing an unintended pregnancy may not immediately be aware that they
are pregnant, and thus delay prenatal care. They also may not be as motivated to discontinue behaviors
that pose pregnancy-related risks (e.g., smoking, consumption of alcohol). Studies show a greater risk
of preterm birth and low birth weight among unintended pregnancies compared with pregnancies that
were planned.”).
67 Id. (“[T]here are significant cost savings to employers from the coverage of contraceptives.”).
68 Id. at 8728 (“Researchers have shown that access to contraception improves the social and economic status of women. Contraceptive coverage, by reducing the number of unintended and potentially
unhealthy pregnancies, furthers the goal of eliminating this disparity by allowing women to achieve equal
status as healthy and productive members of the job force.”).
69 Id. (“[O]wing to reproductive and sex-specific conditions, women use preventive services more than
men, generating significant out-of-pocket expenses for women. The Departments aim to reduce these
disparities by providing women broad access to preventive services, including contraceptive services.”).
70 E.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 783-84 (1972) (“[P]ublic health needs” are “compelling”
government interests.”); Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 498 (10th Cir.1998) (“[P]
ublic health is a compelling government interest… .”).
71 E.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding against Speech
Clause challenge government restrictions on anti-abortion protests designed to protect unimpeded access
to pregnancy-related services); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding against free exercise challenge state restrictions on child labor).
64
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found related interests individually “substantial,” “important,” or “significant.”72
Together these related interests might additionally constitute a collectively “compelling” government goal that would outweigh a nonexempt employer’s interest in personal or group free exercise.
B. Alternative Means

1. Exemption

Wisconsin v. Yoder held that the Amish were entitled to an exemption from a state
statute requiring school attendance until age sixteen.73 Acknowledging that the state
had an undeniably compelling interest in generally requiring a minimum level of education in its citizens, the Court held that the state nevertheless lacked a compelling
interest in applying the statute to the Amish. The Court noted both the strong vocational education that Amish children received from their families and community, as
well as the small number and insularity of Amish communities as factors suggesting
that exempting them from the minimum attendance requirement would have little effect on the state’s overall goal of an educated citizenry properly equipped to support
itself economically and participate in voting and other acts of self-government. Thus,
when religiously burdensome government action is subjected to strict scrutiny, an exemption may be the least restrictive alternative if the number of persons exempted is
so small that the effect on the government’s regulatory purposes is negligible. The
Court has applied this same principle to application of the compelling-interest test
under RFRA.74
The mandate exists to extend no-cost contraceptive services to as many women as
possible. Data are hard to find, but employees of nonexempt nonprofit religious employers in the United States number at least in the hundreds of thousands, if not the
millions, while employees of for-profit religious employers engaged in commercial
markets number at least in the tens of millions. Enlarging the religious employer exemption to include all religious organizations and all secular for-profit employers
owned by persons who object to contraception would substantially undermine the
government’s compelling goals due to the very large numbers of employees who would
be denied contraception coverage by such an exemption.75

72

E.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (State’s “compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens” justified infringement of associational freedom); IMS
Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 277 (2d Cir. 2010) (States “have substantial interest in both lowering
health care costs and protecting public health.”), overruled on other grounds, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) (statute not least restrictive means); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 268 (2000) (Protecting “a woman’s
right to seek reproductive health services” is “important government interest.”); United States v. Wilson,
154 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[P]rotecting women who are in need of reproductive health services” is
“significant government interest.”); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[E]nsuring access
to lawful health services and protecting the constitutional right of women seeking abortions and other
pregnancy-related treatment” are “important government interests.”); cf. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”).
73 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
74 Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429-31 (2006).
75 Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93-94 (Cal.) (“Catholic
Charities argues the Legislature could more widely exempt employers from the [state contraception mandate] without increasing the number of affected women by mandating public funding of prescription
contraceptives for the employees of exempted employers. [] But Catholic Charities points to no authority
requiring the state to subsidize private religious practices.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).
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2. Direct Government Subsidy

Some nonexempt religious employers have argued that the government could ensure
the availability of no-cost contraceptive coverage to women who lack such coverage in
their religious-employer group health plans by paying for such coverage itself. Such
employers argue that this alternative is inexpensive, and thus a less restrictive alternative to application of the mandate to nonexempt religious employers. However, even if
the cost of government provision of no-cost contraception were low, which is doubtful,76
a religious person’s right to an exemption does not include the right to demand that the
government pay for the exemption. The government may do this if it chooses, but it is
not constitutionally required to do so. Having the government pay more money to
implement the contraception mandate solely to exempt a larger range of religious employers is thus not a constitutionally required less-restrictive alternative.
*

*

*

The government has multiple interests which individually and together are “compelling” and which are implemented in the least restrictive manner by the mandate.
Accordingly, regardless of whether the mandate is found to be a neutral and general
law or to substantially burden religious exercise, it still satisfies the doctrinal requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.

IV.

For-Profit Commercial Religious Employers
The principles and conclusions discussed above apply equally to non-profit and
for-profit religious employers. They apply with particular force, however, to for-profit
employers. Federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination in employment incorporate national values that condemn an employer’s use of the economic leverage of current or prospective employment to penalize employees for their religious practices or
to compel them involuntarily to conform to the religious practices of others.
Accordingly, it is well established that neutral and general laws that regulate public or
commercial markets do not generally constitute “substantial burdens” on religious
exercise when the burdened persons or groups have voluntarily entered those markets.77 This is particularly the case when exemption from such laws would impose the
costs of the employer’s religious practices on nonadherents or the government.78

76

See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-05 (1985) (Application of federal
minimum wage standards to a religion’s commercial activities held not a burden on religion’s free exercise
rights.); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06 (Sunday closing law that “imposed some financial sacrifice” on
Orthodox Jewish business owner who observed the Jewish Sabbath did not violate Free Exercise Clause
because law “regulates a secular activity” and merely “operates to make the practice of [the owner’s] religious beliefs more expensive.”).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“When followers of a particular sect enter
into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in
that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the
employer’s religious faith on the employees.”); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859
N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y. 2006) (“[W]hen a religious organization chooses to hire nonbelievers it must, at least
to some degree, be prepared to accept neutral regulations imposed to protect those employees’ legitimate
interests in doing what their own beliefs permit.”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007); cf. Estate of Thornton
v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (finding state statute giving employees absolute right to time off on their
Sabbath violated Establishment Clause because of burden statute imposed on others); TWA v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not give employee right to religious
exemption from seniority system because of burden this would impose on other employees).
77
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Churches and other nonprofit religious organizations enjoy narrow exemptions
from religious antidiscrimination laws,79 but such exemptions have never been granted to for-profit commercial enterprises.80 There is good reason for this. Compliance
with employment laws is complex and burdensome, and exempting for-profit commercial religious employers from such laws will often result in competitive advantage.
More fundamentally, it would enable the use of employment to encourage and even to
compel involuntary employee conformance with the employer’s religious practices.
Finally, the potential number of for-profit commercial religious employers who might
claim this exemption is huge; recognizing it would fundamentally distort employment
markets in favor of religious employers.
Exempting for-profit commercial religious employers from the contraception mandate would have precisely this effect. Such employers are prohibited from making employment decisions on the basis of an applicant’s or employee’s religious affiliation or
lack thereof, and thus virtually always employ large numbers of people who do not
share the religious anti-contraception values of their employer. Granting such employers an exemption from the mandate forces employees to bear the costs of observing the tenets of their employer’s religion even when they do not belong to it or
interpret those tenets differently.
Just as religious employers may not dictate to the government the conditions on
which they will obey the law, they may not dictate the conditions on which government may regulate their participation in public and commercial markets on a forprofit basis.

V.

Conclusion: Religious Liberty Is Not the Right
to Impose One’s Religion on Others
One might argue that the public’s interest in the admittedly extensive public nonprofit services provided by religious universities, hospitals, charities, and other religious employers justify exempting them from the contraception mandate. But the
mandate also provides important public services and protects considerable government interests, notably the enhancement of women’s health and the elimination of
gender inequities. The resolution of conflicts between such interests and values are
properly entrusted to the political branches.
In accordance with the authority granted it by Congress in the ACA, the Executive
Branch has crafted regulations appropriate to constitutional and other national values, by generally exempting religious employers from the mandate when doing so
does not impose the employers’ religious values and practices on employees who do
not share them. This is all that religious employers can reasonably expect. To paraphrase one court, religious liberty is a shield, not a sword; it is not to be used to impose one’s religion on others.81 Religious liberty simply does not entail a right in
religious employers to force their employees to observe and to pay the costs of anticontraception beliefs that the employees do not share.
79 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 702 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1) (exempting
religious employers from the Act “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
to perform work connected with the carrying on” of the religious employer’s activities); Hosanna-Tabor
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 112 S.Ct. 694 (2012) (upholding judicially created exemption from Civil Rights
Act as applied to ministerial employment decisions).
80 E.g, Tony & Susan Alamo, 471 U.S. at 303-05; cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1987) (upholding § 702 against Establishment Clause challenge, but only as to nonprofit activities).
81 See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), slip
op. at 12 (“RFRA is a shield, not a sword. [I]t is not a means to force one’s religious practices on others.”).

